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I.  Introduction 
More than five years after the transition to a market economy began in Russia, 
macro-economic evidence indicated that, despite the initial phenomenon of hyper-
inflation and a halving of industrial production, the performance of the Russian 
labour market diverged from those of other reform-oriented transition economies 
and mass unemployment was slow to emerge. Many enterprises seemed to have 
reacted to the negative shock of transition by reducing working hours, not 
indexing salaries to inflation and allowing wage arrears to build.  As a result real 
wages had fallen steeply since the beginning of the reforms and wage payments 
had been systematically withheld from workers in many industrial branches of the 
economy (see e.g. Layard and Richter, 1996).  The flip side of this strong "price 
adjustment" (Lehmann, Wadsworth and Acquisti, 1998) in the Russian labour 
market is a quite sluggish downsizing of the workforce.  Even keeping 
measurement problems in mind, it is clear that in the first years of transition 
employment has fallen by substantially less than GDP and by much less than 
industrial production.  Foley (1997) and Gimpelson and Lippoldt (1998) 
document, using micro data, other important stylised facts of labour market 
adjustment in Russia: compared to most Central European countries transitions 
between employment and non-employment are large and hiring rates are high.      
To fully understand this "dynamic" labour market adjustment more hard 
evidence, in particular at the micro level, is needed.  In this paper we use a large 
enterprise level data set for four representative regions
1 to look at job creation and 
job destruction, one of the central elements of labour market adjustment in 
transition economies.   Job creation and job destruction in Russia was analysed by 
Richter and Schaffer (1996). However, the data that they used consisted of a 
sample of 435 firms collected in 1994 while we have around 6,000 medium and   3
large establishments and 5,000 small firms in our data set, which covers the above 
mentioned regions. The observations on medium and large enterprises are census-
type data in the industries manufacturing, construction and trade for 1996 and 
1997, while the data on small firms is a random sample in the same industries and 
for the same years.  We thus are able to extend the analysis to firms of all sizes 
and ownership types.  In this paper we only look at the data from the year 1997 as 
these data have been particularly well collected and processed.    
There is now an emerging consensus in the literature that labour market flows in 
CEE are at least as much determined by demand factors as by supply factors.  
Looking at how firm behaviour influences job creation and destruction and labour 
turnover is, therefore, essential if one wants to get a complete picture of labour 
market adjustment in a transition economy.  By studying the enterprise level data we 
will have a fuller picture of labour market dynamics in Russia.  By analysing gross 
job and workers flows we also provide an empirical contribution to the literature on 
restructuring that has been mainly theoretical (e.g. Aghion and Blanchard, 1994; 
Chadha, Coricelli and Kranjak, 1993; Blanchard, 1997).     
There are at least three reasons why it is important to look at job creation and job 
destruction when analysing labour market adjustment in transition economies.  First, 
there is a recent increased interest from both labour and industrial organisation 
economists in the theoretical and empirical aspects of gross flows of jobs (e.g. Davis 
and Haltiwanger, 1992).  However, we know very little about gross job flows in 
Russia, despite the obvious relevance given the shocks affecting the Russian 
economy.  We expect to gain some insights into the nature of firm adjustment in the 
Russian economy by studying various aspects of gross job flows, such as sector-
specific, ownership and size effects.    4
Secondly, there is now a large literature on labour market adjustment in 
transition economies using aggregate employment data and micro-data from 
household and labour force surveys.  This literature characterises unemployment in 
virtually all countries as a "stagnant pool" which imposes a heavy social burden on 
transition economies.  Recent evidence shows that supply-side factors cannot only 
be held responsible for this result (Boeri, Lehmann and Wörgötter, 1996).  None of 
the policy measures in CEE countries meant to increase job search efforts by the 
unemployed seem to have raised outflow rates from unemployment in a discernible 
way.  Weak labour demand seems to drive labour market flows in most transition 
economies.  As was already stressed, labour market flows are different in Russia.  
How much labour demand contributes to this difference can be partially explained 
by examining gross job flows.  
Thirdly, the evidence collected in this part of the project will allow us to address 
the question of the sources of growth of the new private sector.  Because of the 
distorted structure of output at the start of transition, one could expect initial rapid 
growth in certain sectors: trade, services, certain consumer goods, etc.  This could 
imply that overall private sector growth will slow down after the stock adjustment 
process has come to an end and new firms stop entering and expanding in 
underrepresented sectors.  Similarly, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
were rare under the socialist system.  One might, therefore, expect initial rapid 
growth by new firms as they enter and fill the SME "niche", followed by a 
slowdown as the niche is filled.  One of the crucial questions we will ask when 
analysing the evidence will be whether there is robust job creation by new private 
firms in Russia (as found by Richter and Schaffer, 1996, and by Konings, Lehmann 
and Schaffer, 1996, in the case of Poland) and whether this appears to be driven by 
ownership and/or life-cycle effects rather than purely sectoral or size effects.   5
The paper has four more sections.  In the next section we define the job flow 
measures that we use in our analysis and discuss the Russian enterprise-level data.  
Section III presents gross job flow rates across ownership types, industries, regions 
and size categories.  Section IV tries to rigorously estimate the determination of net 
employment growth rates using OLS and Instrumental Variables regressions, while 
section V offers some tentative conclusions. 
 
II. Definitions and Data 
Net employment change in an economy is the result of firm expansion and 
firm entry on the one hand and firm contraction and firm exit on the other.  The 
employment flows underlying this firm behaviour are referred to as “gross flows 
of jobs”.   We construct these flows using the net growth rates that are 
conventional in this literature rather than the more common log growth rates.  
Following Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) we define this growth rate as 
 
git  = nit – ni,t-1 / xit     (1) 
 
where nit stands for employment of firm i at time t and xit = (nit + ni,t-1) / 2 is the 
average size of firm i.  This net employment growth rate, being symmetric and 
lying in the interval [-2,2], can take account of entry, expansion, contraction and 
exit of firms.
2  Let Xt be total average employment of the economy or of the sector 
under investigation, i.e. let Xt = Si˛I xit, where I stands for the set of all firms in the 
economy or in the sector.  The job creation rate is then defined as  
   6
pos ” ” Si˛I+ git(xit/Xt) = Si˛I+ (nit – ni,t-1) / Xt,  (2) 
 
where I+ is the subset of expanding/entering firms.  The job creation rate is thus 
defined as the weighted sum of all positive net growth rates in the economy or in 
the sector.  Alternatively we can think of this rate as the increase in employment in 
expanding firms expressed as a proportion of total employment.  The job 
destruction rate is defined analogously as 
 
neg ” ” Si˛I- |git|(xit/Xt) = Si˛I- |nit – ni,t-1| / Xt,  (3) 
 
where we now sum over the subset of contracting/exiting firms, I-.  The job 
destruction rate, normally expressed in absolute value, can also be interpreted as 
the absolute value of the decrease in employment in contracting firms as a 
proportion of total employment. 
The gross job reallocation rate (gross) is defined as the sum of pos and neg, 
while the net change of employment is represented by net = pos – neg.  If net 
employment changes are very large and mainly driven by contraction and exit, as 
will be the case  particularly during the early phase of transition, then gross might 
not capture the reallocation of jobs very well.
3  The alternative measure of job 
reallocation, excess = gross - |net|, is therefore often used to catch job reallocation 
in excess of the amount necessary to accommodate a net aggregate employment 
change.  We can also think of excess as an index of firm heterogeneity with 
respect to job creation and destruction in an economy or a given sector.   7
The 1997 data sets for medium and large firms and small firms respectively 
are described in Tables 1 and 2.  The data on the medium and large firms show 
that the lion’s share of employment is in manufacturing and mining, with about 
two thirds of all employees.  This contrasts with a frequency of around one third 
of manufacturing and mining firms in the sample.  Average employment must, 
therefore, be much larger in manufacturing than in construction and distribution 
and trade. This is confirmed in the last two columns of Table 1.  Nearly half of all 
firms in the sample are in distribution and trade; this industry had, however, only 
11% of employment in 1997, of which around 60% are in the private sector.  On 
the other hand, around two thirds of employees in manufacturing and mining work 
in firms with mixed ownership which make up about half of all manufacturing 
firms.  A majority of construction workers are also employed in firms with mixed 
ownership.  Firms where the state is the sole owner represent about a third of the 
firms in the three industries, but have a lower employment share, varying between 
15% and 24%.  
Our random sample of small firms consists of more than 80% of private 
firms as Table 5.2 shows.  It is likely that firms which are identified as private in 
Table 2 are actually de novo private firms.  Most probably, firms labelled “mixed 
domestic” are spin-offs from large partly privatised firms.  They make up the rest 
of the small firms data set as other ownership types are absent from our data in 
1997.  Most of the firms in the two relevant ownership categories are continuing 
firms.  However, the proportion of new firms entering the three industries reaches 
nearly 25% in the case of de novo private, and 35% in the case of mixed firms.  
These numbers would suggest that it is important to distinguish between the 
performance of all small firms and of small continuing firms only.    8
The distributions of the net growth rates as defined in this section are 
presented in Figures 1-5.  A look at the four regions combined shows that these 
rates are very different for large and medium firms on the one hand and for small 
firms on the other hand (Figure 1).  Job destruction is prevalent among the former, 
while small firms seem overall to create more jobs than they seem to destroy.  The 
other point one can take from these figures is the difference in the importance of 
entry to overall job creation.  While there are some large and medium firms that 
are new entrants in both years, the frequency of the net growth rate 2 is small in 
the distributions of net employment growth rates for these firms.  In contrast, the 
net growth rate 2, representing entry, is by far the most frequent rate in the 1997 
distribution of net employment growth rates of small firms.  Much of the 
difference in job reallocation between large and medium state, privatised and 
private firms and small de novo private firms might be driven by this large 
proportion of entrants in the latter sector. Therefore, estimated job flow rates are 
presented for all medium and large firms, for all small firms and for continuing 
small firms as well. In the performed regressions, where the data for medium and 
large and small firms are pooled, we distinguish between the determination of 
employment growth for all firms and for continuing firms.   Finally, regional 
differences in net growth rates of employment should be pointed out (cf. Figures 
2-5).  As far as medium and large firms are concerned these differences are small, 
as job destruction dominates in all regions.  The distributions of net employment 
growth rates for small firms, on the other hand, differ substantially by region.  In 
particular Moscow, but also Chuvashia, have a very large fraction of entrants so 
much of the job creation in these two regions is caused by new firms entering the 
market.   Chelyabinsk has a much lower fraction of new entrants and most of its   9
job creation in the small firms sector comes from relatively small positive net 
employment changes of continuing firms.
4      
  
III.  Job Reallocation across Ownership, Industries, Size and Regions 
 Tables 3 – 5 present various statistics describing job flows in the chosen four 
Russian regions in 1997 for large and medium firms.  In Table 3 we aggregate 
across regions along industries and within industry we also look at job flows by 
ownership type.  As the data cover only three industries out of ten it is not possible 
to aggregate across industries along regional or ownership lines.  This might imply 
that overall job creation and destruction rates can only be computed for each 
industry separately, but not for each region or ownership type.
5  Since firm size, 
measured as average employment, seems to be an important determinant of job 
creation and destruction in western countries (see e.g. Davis and Haltiwanger, 
1992), but also in transition economies (see Konings, Lehmann and Schaffer, 
1996), size categories are introduced in the remaining four tables.  Table 4 
presents the five job flow measures, which were defined above, as well as job 
creation and destruction shares in two-way cells (size by industry) while Table 5 
presents the same measures in three-way cells (size by industry by ownership).   
Large and medium firms in the three industries destroyed many more jobs 
than they created in 1997 as Table 3 clearly shows.  For manufacturing and mining 
job destruction was 4 times as large as job creation in 1997, while in construction 
this ratio was around 8.  Only distribution and trade had at about 6% a substantial 
job creation rate in 1997, whilst having a similar job destruction rate as the 
construction industry.   This larger job creation rate of the former industry can also 
explain why, on our measure of excess job reallocation, it has a job reallocation   10
process, which is much more pronounced than in the other two industries.  The 
results presented thus far also hold across ownership types.  A further interesting 
fact is the relatively low job destruction rate in manufacturing and mining.  If one 
takes job destruction as a proxy for labour shedding, which seems sensible in the 
case of downsizing firms in a transition economy, the data show a manufacturing 
and mining industry with very sluggish labour adjustment.  It is also interesting 
that privatised firms do not behave differently in this regard from state owned 
firms or firms with mixed domestic ownership.  Finally, in distribution and trade 
privatised firms account for around 70% of job creation in 1997, and for around 
63% of job destruction.  In manufacturing, mining and construction, on the other 
hand, the bulk of job creation and destruction occurs in firms with mixed domestic 
ownership.              
There is a strong negative correlation between firm size and job creation in 
all three industries: Table 4 shows job creation rates that are monotonically 
decreasing in size.  Such a negative correlation also exists in 1997 for job 
destruction in manufacturing and mining and construction.  In distribution and 
trade, on the other hand, no clear pattern emerges as far as size and job destruction 
is concerned. The clear lack of relationship between size and net employment 
growth rate is also noteworthy. The estimated excess job reallocation rates show a 
much stronger job reallocation process among firms with modest employment 
levels, while the job flows of large firms are dominated by job destruction.  The 
larger excess job reallocation rates among smaller firms also imply a more 
heterogeneous behaviour of these firms as far as job creation and destruction are 
concerned.  In contrast, large firms in the three industries are much more uniform 
in their employment policies: they do not create many new jobs, while destroying 
a substantial fraction of the existing jobs.  However, in manufacturing and mining   11
a very small job creation rate among large enterprises does not necessarily mean 
that large firms did not contribute to the job creation that occurred.  The job 
creation share statistics say that firms with more than 200 employees created in 
1997 around 80% of all jobs created in manufacturing and mining.  In construction 
and distribution and trade, on the other hand, firms with less than 200 employees 
contributed with 76% to job creation.  As far as job destruction is concerned, very 
large firms in manufacturing and mining and in construction destroyed in 1997 
most jobs, while in distribution and trade job destruction was much more uniform 
across the size distribution. 
The three-way cells (size by industry by ownership) presented in Table 5 
show very few clear patterns as far as firm size and job flows are concerned.  In 
1997, a negative correlation between size and job creation and job reallocation can 
be seen only with private firms in manufacturing.  With job destruction this 
correlation is less clear no matter what the ownership type or the industry. 
Additional information can be gained from inspecting these three-way cells, 
though.  Especially in manufacturing and mining and distribution and trade, state 
firms with less than 50 employees lag far behind private and mixed firms when it 
comes to job creation and job destruction.  Apart from state-owned firms in 
distribution and trade firms with less than 100 employees have the highest job 
destruction rates no matter what the industry or the ownership type, reaching a 
maximum of 31% in 1997 in the case of private manufacturing firms.   In these 
size categories, similar patterns for excess job reallocation can be observed.  What 
is also noteworthy is the fact that private and mixed firms with more than 2000 
employees destroyed a large fraction of their existing jobs in the industries 
construction and distribution and trade, varying between one fifth and one third of 
all jobs.  Clearly, large firms in manufacturing and mining were much more   12
conservative in 1997 when it came to eliminating jobs.  In construction, the 
contributions to job creation and job destruction seem to be different across the 
two years for construction.  With respect to manufacturing and mining as well as 
distribution and trade we observe, however, that, irrespective of ownership type, 
the largest job creation shares can be found in medium-sized firms.  Finally, in 
manufacturing despite a conservative employment policy among large firms 
between a third and half of all jobs, which were eliminated in 1997, were 
destroyed by firms with more than 2000 employees.        
As already stated, the employment dynamics graphed in Figures 1 – 5 seem 
to hint at different job flows for small firms in general and for continuing small 
firms. Therefore, estimates of job flow measures for the two groups are presented 
separately: Tables 6 and 7 present one way cells of ownership type and size 
categories, Tables 8 and 9 present two way cells of ownership by size for the two 
groups of firms.   Figures 2, 4 and 5 also show differences in regional performance 
as far as the net employment growth of small firms is concerned.   Hence Table 10 
shows the four basic job flow measures
6 for small firms in three regions. One 
needs to stress, though, that the job flow measures are calculated only for the three 
industries of the regional economies for which we have collected data. 
Tables 6 and 7 give the surprising result that both in terms of job creation 
and job destruction “mixed domestic firms”, i.e. firms owned by the state and by 
private residents, perform better than “private firms”, i.e. de novo private firms.  
When we take all firms, the job creation rate is about 25 percentage points higher, 
the job destruction rate about 5 percentage points lower for mixed firms.  This 
superior performance of mixed firms is still present when we calculate these 
measures for continuing small firms only, however, it becomes less pronounced.  
When we look at all small firms job creation is monotonically decreasing in size   13
as is net employment growth.  This inverse relationship between size and these 
two job flow measures disappears when we restrict ourselves to continuing firms.  
It is important to note that the positive net employment growth for firms with less 
than 100 employees is entirely due to entry as a comparison of column 3 in Tables 
6 and 7 makes apparent.  In other words, continuing firms destroy more jobs than 
they create and most of the job creation observed in the three regions for which 
data are available relates to new firms entering the labour market. The excess job 
reallocation rate is large relative to medium and large firms of comparable size,
 7 
whether all or only continuing firms are considered.  This is what we would 
expect; small, mainly de novo firms show much more heterogeneity in job creation 
than medium and large firms.  Especially for continuing firms this heterogeneity is 
not a function of size.  Finally, inspection of the last three columns in Tables 6 and 
7 shows that de novo  private firms are under-represented as far as job creation is 
concerned, but that they have more than their proportional job destruction share.  
One can also infer from these columns that firms, which employ between 20 and 
49 employees, create and destroy the lion’s share of jobs, but that these shares are 
approximately proportional to their size share.   
When interacting ownership with size in Tables 8 and 9, the same results 
are obtained as previously with respect to the job creation rates.  With the full 
sample pos is monotonically decreasing in size for both private and mixed firms 
that have less than 100 employees.  This inverse relationship disappears when we 
look only at continuing firms.  For private and mixed continuing firms the excess 
job reallocation rate points to heterogeneity in job reallocation that is pretty 
uniform across size categories.  Firms with between 20 and 49 employees 
dominate job creation in particular in the case of mixed ownership with a job 
creation share of more than one half in both samples.  It is also noteworthy that in   14
this size category mixed firms perform decisively better than private firms as far 
as net employment growth is concerned.  Even in the case of continuing firms net 
employment growth is still positive with 3% whilst private firms have a net 
employment growth rate of roughly –11%.   
With the full data set Moscow performs particularly well, Chelyabinsk 
particularly poorly as far as job creation and job destruction are concerned.  A 
comparison of the first rows of the upper and lower panels of Table 10 shows that 
this difference in performance nearly disappears when we exclude entering firms.  
So, entry of new firms is absolutely crucial for the better performance of small 
firms in Moscow.  In all three regions private firms create less jobs and destroy 
more jobs than do mixed firms even if this difference in performance becomes 
much weaker with continuing firms only.  For both samples job creation is 
inversely related to size in Moscow, but not in the other two regions.  Finally, in 
all three regions firms of employee size between 20 and 49 dominate both job 
creation and job destruction.  In Chelyabinsk, though, this size class has not only a 
much larger job destruction share than in the other two regions, but also a large 
negative employment growth rate (in absolute value) in both samples.  So, the 
poor performance of Chelyabinsk should be related to poorly performing firms of 
this size class that performs well elsewhere.             
      
IV.  The Determination of Employment Growth: Ownership, Size and 
Regional Effects 
The rates calculated to measure job creation, destruction and reallocation 
are all based on net growth rates at the enterprise level.  It is possible therefore to 
take advantage of the variation across individual firms to establish the underlying   15
determinants of job creation. In the industrial organisation literature there exists a 
large body of research analysing firm growth, looking at the relationship between 
firm level growth rates and initial size.
8  Following Konings, Lehmann and 
Schaffer (1996) we extend this analysis by including ownership effects.  The firm-
level growth rate is then a function of firm size and ownership type.  One 
hypothesis, which we wish to test, says that in transition economies de novo 
private firms behave differently to firms of all other ownership types: they are 
more dynamic than state-owned and privatised firms and contribute, relative to 
their employment share, disproportionately to positive employment growth.  We 
are also interested in the question whether regional location matters for Russian 
firms' performance once we control for industrial composition, size and ownership 
factors.  Lehmann, Wadsworth and Acquisti (1998) showed that the labour market 
experience of workers varies dramatically across Russian regions.  Here, we 
would like to see whether and how the regional environment affects labour 
demand of firms that belong to different industries and ownership types.  
We estimate a class of models, which in its most restricted form is: 
 
git = a0 + a1ln(xit) + a2 ownershipi + a3 ln(xit) ￿ ownershipi + uit   (4) 
 
where git is the net growth rate defined in (5.1) and ownershipi  is an indicator for 
the ownership category into which firm i falls,
9 while uit is an error term which is 
independently but not necessarily normally distributed.  First, these equations are 
estimated for the joint data of medium and large firms and small firms. These data 
represent the ‘full’ data set.  It is also possible to look at the determination of the 
net growth rates using a smaller data set that includes continuing firms only.
 10   16
Finally we investigate how size and ownership type impact on employment 
growth in medium and large firms.   All the estimations are done for the year 1997 
only, as we have more complete data for that year. 
One econometric issue needs to be mentioned in connection with these 
estimations. In equation (4) the average annual employment, xit, appears both on 
the left-hand and the right-hand side.  If an important component of uit is 
measurement error, which is very likely with this kind of data, then xit will be 
correlated with the error term, and the coefficient estimates on the ownership 
variables and the interaction terms will be inconsistent.   Following Durbin (1955), 
we use the size ranking of the firm as an instrument for the average annual 
employment and hope to eliminate this potential measurement error problem. 
Tables 11 and 12 show results of weighted regressions for the pooled data 
of medium and large and small firms.  As the small firms data set consists of 
around 10% of all small firms in a region while medium and large firms data are 
collected in a census like fashion, we give the small firms a weight that is 10 times 
as large as medium and large firms. Since we do not have any data on small firms 
in Krasnoyarsk we use this region as the default category in these pooled 
regressions.
11  In manufacturing and mining we have branch identifiers which 
allow us to control for a finer industrial structure.   
The results of the regressions seem robust to the estimation method for both 
the full data set and continuing firms as far as significance levels are concerned. 
However, the instrumental variables estimation gives larger values of the 
significant coefficients (in absolute value) and rarely also changes the sign of the 
coefficients.  From the results it is pretty clear that the full data set on one hand   17
and continuing firms on the other hand need to be discussed separately. One can 
furthermore infer that OLS estimation gives probably inconsistent results. 
Size per se is clearly not a predictor of net employment growth in both 
Tables 11 and 12.  Only when size is interacted with ownership do we see a 
significant positive effect of size for all firms.  At first sight it seems quite 
surprising that private and mixed firms have a lower net employment growth than 
state-owned firms do.  However, the coefficients on the variables private and 
mixed relate to all firms, medium and large and small.  Once ownership is 
interacted with small firms we see very large and significant ownership effects in 
the full data set of Table 11.  These ownership effects clearly dominate all other 
effects and generate for moderate levels of employment positive net growth rates.  
Inspection of the coefficients on triple interactions of size, small firm and private 
ownership allows to see that at employment levels exceeding e.g. 50 employees 
the predicted net growth rate can be negative.   A firm located in Moscow has on 
average a much higher net employment growth than a firm located in Krasnoyarsk 
whilst Chuvashia and particularly Chelyabinsk perform worse in this respect even 
after size, ownership and industry effects are taken into account. 
The results of the pooled regression for continuing firms are quite different. 
The significant coefficients are substantially smaller than in the case of the full 
data set. Also, the coefficients on the mixed ownership dummy and its interaction 
terms with size and small are no longer significant apart from the interaction term 
mixed*small in the instrumental variables estimation.  Continuing firms both in 
Moscow and Chuvashia perform now better than Krasnoyarsk, albeit only slightly, 
whilst a continuing firm located in Chelyabinsk is ceteris paribus not different 
from such a firm located in Krasnoyarsk. The main difference to the regression 
results using the full data set relates to the coefficient estimates on the double and   18
triple interaction terms that involve small firms.  Assuming that the instrumental 
variables estimates are consistent, the sign of the coefficient on the term that 
interacts private ownership and small firm becomes negative while the coefficient 
on the triple interaction term  lnsize*small*private takes a positive value. As far as 
continuing firms are concerned, small de novo private firms perform only better 
than state-owned or mixed firms do when they are relatively large.  When we look 
at all firms including those which just entered the reverse seems to be the case: 
small de novo private but also mixed firms with relatively few employees create 
more jobs than do state-owned firms. 
Table 13 presents some predicted net employment growth rates for firms 
with selected characteristics.  The predictions are based on significant coefficients 
of the regressions in Tables 11 and 12 and allow us to calculate size-dependent net 
growth rate differentials.  One of the most striking results from these predictions is 
the very good performance of small firms with mixed ownership that have 10 
employees, which is the average employment level of this firm type.  Mixed firms 
of this size perform slightly better than small private firms of a comparable size 
and much better than state-owned or private medium and large firms.  Moreover, 
the size-dependent differentials between large and medium state and mixed firms 
on the one hand and small private firms on the other hand are very small for 
continuing firms.  
The regressions for medium and large firms show for all firms and for 
continuing firms that size does not predict net employment growth.  From Table 
14, and in particular from Table 15, it is also possible to see that state-owned firms 
seem to actually create more jobs than private and mixed firms, albeit the 
ownership effects are rather small.  Size interacted with private ownership 
compensates somewhat for the negative ownership effect such that a large private   19
firm (with for example more than 500 employees) can overtake a state-owned firm 
of any size.  A medium-and-large-sized firm located in Chuvashia performs 
slightly better than such firms in the other regions. Being located in Moscow does 
not improve net employment growth for a medium-and-large-sized firm.  Finally, 
relative to energy and mining the industries trade/distribution and construction as 
well as the branches within manufacturing perform substantially worse on our 
measure of net employment growth.     
         
V. Conclusions 
In this paper we have used unique micro-evidence to explore job turnover in 
the Russian Federation in 1997.  
Figures 1 – 5 made it clear that medium and large firms are mainly 
destroying jobs while small firms contribute significantly to job creation in the 
country.  If we assume that private firms in the data set of medium and large firms 
are mainly privatised and that private firms in the sample of small firms are 
mainly de novo private firms, we can also see a clear difference in the job creation 
performance of these two types of private firms.  Privatised firms are no better 
than state-owned firms whilst de novo private firms have a decisively superior 
record relative to these firms when it comes to job creation.  As is also clear from 
the analysis, much of this better performance is due to entry into the labour 
market.  Entry actually seems to drive many of the presented results: the 
surprisingly good performance of small firms with mixed ownership is mainly due 
to entry.  Also, the spectacular job creation rate of small firms in Moscow 
vanishes if we exclude entering firms. 
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Appendix: Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1 - Description of large and medium firms according to ownership type – 1997   
 
    Total 
Employment* 
Number of Firms  Average Employment  Employment share**  Frequency** 
 
All  Manufacturing, mining  1364033  2029  672  0.67  0.35 
  Construction  438068  1162  377  0.22  0.20 
  Distribution trade  229133  2635  87  0.11  0.45 
State***  Manufacturing, mining  209654  644  326  0.15  0.32 
  Construction  95352  362  263  0.24  0.31 
  Distribution trade  51527  913  56  0.23  0.35 
Private  Manufacturing, mining  236686  425  557  0.17  0.21 
  Construction  116263  335  347  0.29  0.29 
  Distribution trade  139113  1547  90  0.61  0.59 
Mixed  Manufacturing, mining  917694  960  956  0.67  0.47 
domestic  Construction  186865  464  403  0.47  0.40 
  Distribution trade  37881  170  223  0.17  0.06 
 
* Calculated as yearly average total employment. ** Ownership shares and frequencies refer to the total for a given industry. 
*** The ownership category of 3 firms in 1997 could not be identified. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on firm-level data provided by Gostkomstat. 
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Table 2 - Description of small firms according to ownership type – 1997 
 
  All**  Private  Mixed domestic 
Total Employment*  54175  44979  9197 
  40339  34380  5960 
Number of Firms  5163  4512  650 
  3755  3359  395 
Average Employment  10.5  9.9  14.1 
  10.7  10.2  15.1 
Employment share    0.83  0.17 
    0.85  0.15 
Frequency    0.87  0.13 
    0.89  0.11 
 
* Calculated as yearly average total employment. 
** In italics: continuing firms. 
**** The ownership category of 2 firms in 1996 and of 1 firm in 1997 could not be identified. 




Table 3 - Job flows by ownership type and industry – 1997, large and medium firms 
 
 
Industry  All  State  Private 
Mixed 
domestic 
Pos  Manuf., mining  0.026  0.026  0.033  0.024 
  Construction  0.020  0.013  0.022  0.026 
  Distr., trade  0.063  0.045  0.071  0.032 
Neg  Manuf., mining  0.100  0.099  0.104  0.099 
  Construction  0.167  0.143  0.180  0.180 
  Distr., trade  0.157  0.122  0.162  0.190 
Net  Manuf., mining  -0.075  -0.073  -0.071  -0.076 
  Construction  -0.147  -0.131  -0.158  -0.154 
  Distr., trade  -0.094  -0.076  -0.091  -0.158 
Gross  Manuf., mining  0.126  0.125  0.137  0.123 
  Construction  0.187  0.156  0.202  0.206 
  Distr., trade  0.220  0.167  0.233  0.222 
Excess  Manuf., mining  0.051  0.052  0.065  0.047 
  Construction  0.039  0.025  0.045  0.052 
  Distr., trade  0.126  0.091  0.143  0.064 
Job creat.  Manuf., mining    0.156  0.221  0.623 
share*  Construction    0.138  0.302  0.560 
  Distr., trade    0.164  0.695  0.085 
Job destr.  Manuf., mining    0.152  0.180  0.668 
share*  Construction    0.200  0.307  0.493 
  Distr., trade    0.174  0.626  0.200 
 
* Shares refer to the total for a given industry and add up to 1 across ownership categories. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on firm-level data provided by Gostkomstat.   23
 
Table 4 - Job flows by size and industry – 1997, large and medium firms 
 
  Industry  0-49  50-99  100-199  200-499  500-999  1000-1999  >2000 
Pos  Manuf., mining  0.081  0.078  0.070  0.055  0.039  0.024  0.011 
  Construction  0.097  0.093  0.056  0.037  0.034  0.002  0 
  Distr., trade  0.101  0.076  0.088  0.064  0.018  0  0 
Neg  Manuf., mining  0.193  0.184  0.145  0.136  0.111  0.114  0.080 
  Construction  0.283  0.224  0.179  0.136  0.147  0.127  0.174 
  Distr., trade  0.150  0.170  0.143  0.125  0.131  0.203  0.239 
Net  Manuf., mining  -0.112  -0.106  -0.075  -0.081  -0.072  -0.090  -0.069 
  Construction  -0.187  -0.131  -0.123  -0.099  -0.113  -0.125  -0.174 
  Distr., trade  -0.049  -0.093  -0.055  -0.062  -0.113  -0.203  -0.239 
Gross  Manuf., mining  0.274  0.262  0.214  0.192  0.150  0.138  0.090 
  Construction  0.380  0.316  0.236  0.172  0.180  0.129  0.174 
  Distr., trade  0.250  0.246  0.230  0.189  0.148  0.203  0.239 
Excess  Manuf., mining  0.162  0.156  0.139  0.111  0.079  0.048  0.021 
  Construction  0.193  0.185  0.112  0.074  0.067  0.004  0 
  Distr., trade  0.201  0.153  0.175  0.127  0.035  0  0 
Job creat.   Manuf., mining  0.016  0.051  0.136  0.260  0.189  0.118  0.231 
share*  Construction  0.082  0.184  0.291  0.277  0.159  0.007  0 
  Distr., trade  0.316  0.220  0.225  0.212  0.027  0  0 
Job destr.   Manuf., mining  0.010  0.031  0.072  0.163  0.136  0.143  0.446 
share*  Construction  0.028  0.053  0.109  0.121  0.082  0.046  0.561 
  Distr., trade  0.188  0.195  0.147  0.167  0.081  0.065  0.156 
 
* Shares refer to the total for a given industry and add up to 1 across ownership categories. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on firm-level data provided by Gostkomstat.   24
Table 5 - Job flows by size, industry and ownership – 1997, large and medium firms 







Size  Ownership  Man  Cons  Dist  Man  Cons  Dist  Man  Cons  Dist  Man  Cons  Dist  Man  Cons  Dist  Man  Cons  Dist 
0-  State  0.035  0.085  0.067  0.149  0.301  0.074  -0.114  -0.216  -0.007  0.069  0.170  0.134  0.030  0.243  0.468  0.034  0.075  0.193 
49  Private  0.149  0.085  0.112  0.311  0.276  0.191  -0.162  -0.190  -0.079  0.299  0.171  0.224  0.012  0.049  0.308  0.008  0.020  0.231 
  Mixed domestic  0.194  0.120  0.254  0.277  0.263  0.223  -0.083  -0.143  0.031  0.389  0.239  0.446  0.014  0.060  0.334  0.005  0.019  0.050 
50-  State  0.062  0.021  0.066  0.140  0.253  0.096  -0.078  -0.231  -0.031  0.124  0.043  0.131  0.105  0.098  0.177  0.062  0.101  0.098 
99  Private  0.143  0.065  0.070  0.170  0.220  0.178  -0.027  -0.155  -0.108  0.286  0.130  0.140  0.081  0.112  0.227  0.030  0.047  0.253 
  Mixed domestic  0.062  0.164  0.124  0.235  0.204  0.242  -0.173  -0.040  -0.118  0.124  0.329  0.248  0.026  0.245  0.306  0.023  0.044  0.101 
100-  State  0.037  0.029  0.082  0.113  0.142  0.158  -0.077  -0.113  -0.076  0.073  0.058  0.165  0.121  0.232  0.193  0.099  0.100  0.138 
199  Private  0.079  0.044  0.093  0.137  0.190  0.139  -0.058  -0.146  -0.046  0.158  0.087  0.186  0.177  0.301  0.253  0.097  0.164  0.167 
  Mixed domestic  0.083  0.085  0.057  0.166  0.189  0.152  -0.082  -0.104  -0.095  0.167  0.170  0.114  0.125  0.299  0.209  0.059  0.096  0.094 
200-  State  0.030  0.020  0.029  0.109  0.124  0.152  -0.079  -0.105  -0.122  0.059  0.040  0.059  0.195  0.245  0.158  0.188  0.135  0.303 
499  Private  0.078  0.040  0.064  0.144  0.131  0.108  -0.066  -0.090  -0.044  0.156  0.081  0.128  0.395  0.308  0.177  0.229  0.124  0.133 
  Mixed domestic  0.056  0.043  0.019  0.144  0.144  0.149  -0.088  -0.102  -0.130  0.112  0.085  0.039  0.228  0.269  0.120  0.139  0.131  0.156 
500-  State  0.028  0.016  0.002  0.077  0.154  0.235  -0.049  -0.138  -0.233  0.055  0.033  0.003  0.124  0.183  0.004  0.091  0.151  0.218 
999  Private  0.025  0.053  0.030  0.111  0.124  0.088  -0.086  -0.071  -0.059  0.050  0.106  0.060  0.121  0.230  0.035  0.168  0.067  0.046 
  Mixed domestic  0.047  0.034  0.008  0.119  0.157  0.107  -0.072  -0.123  -0.099  0.094  0.068  0.015  0.230  0.115  0.030  0.138  0.076  0.072 
1000-  State  0.063  0  0  0.132  0.179  0.095  -0.069  -0.179  -0.095  0.126  0  0  0.363  0  0  0.199  0.090  0.019 
1999  Private  0.026  0  0  0.077  0.217  0.236  -0.051  -0.217  -0.236  0.052  0  0  0.166  0  0  0.153  0.030  0.075 
  Mixed domestic  0.010  0.003  0  0.129  0.091  0.171  -0.119  -0.087  -0.171  0.019  0.007  0  0.040  0.012  0  0.127  0.046  0.073 
>2000  State  0.004  0  0  0.079  0.113  0.052  -0.075  -0.113  -0.052  0.008  0  0  0.061  0  0  0.328  0.348  0.031 
  Private  0.004  0  0  0.087  0.197  0.331  -0.083  -0.197  -0.331  0.008  0  0  0.048  0  0  0.316  0.549  0.096 
  Mixed domestic  0.012  0  0  0.079  0.206  0.245  -0.066  -0.206  -0.245  0.025  0  0  0.338  0  0  0.509  0.589  0.454 
 
* Shares refer to the total for a given industry and ownership type and add up to 1 across row entries in the corresponding ownership category. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on firm-level data provided by Gostkomstat.   25
 
 
Table 6 - Separate job flows by ownership type and by size – 1997, small firms 
 





All  0.595  0.167  0.428  0.763  0.335       
Private  0.554  0.176  0.378  0.729  0.352  0.772  0.871  0.830 
Mixed 
domestic 
0.800  0.127  0.673  0.926  0.254  0.228  0.129  0.170 
0-4  0.872  0.170  0.703  1.042  0.339  0.070  0.048  0.048 
5-9  0.842  0.217  0.625  1.059  0.433  0.152  0.140  0.108 
10-19  0.698  0.184  0.514  0.882  0.368  0.219  0.205  0.187 
20-49  0.647  0.170  0.477  0.817  0.340  0.459  0.429  0.423 
50-99  0.254  0.123  0.131  0.377  0.246  0.098  0.169  0.230 
>100  0.132  0.323  -0.191  0.454  0.263  0.001  0.008  0.004 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on firm-level data provided by Gostkomstat.   26
 
 
Table 7 - Separate job flows by ownership type and by size – 1997, continuing small firms 
  
 






All  0.126  0.211  -0.085  0.338  0.253       
Private  0.122  0.216  -0.094  0.338  0.244  0.821  0.868  0.852 
Mixed 
domestic 
0.153  0.190  -0.036  0.343  0.307  0.179  0.132  0.148 
1-4  0.133  0.231  -0.098  0.364  0.266  0.039  0.041  0.038 
5-9  0.126  0.328  -0.202  0.454  0.252  0.088  0.137  0.088 
10-19  0.134  0.261  -0.127  0.395  0.268  0.185  0.216  0.175 
20-49  0.134  0.217  -0.084  0.351  0.267  0.430  0.418  0.408 
50-99  0.111  0.133  -0.022  0.244  0.222  0.251  0.180  0.286 
>100  0.132  0.323  -0.191  0.454  0.263  0.006  0.009  0.006 
 




Table 8 - Job flows by size and ownership – 1997, small firms 
 









1.019  0.173  0.846  1.192  0.345  0.033  0.035 




1.161  0.141  1.020  1.303  0.283  0.132  0.101 




1.037  0.172  0.865  1.209  0.344  0.229  0.239 




0.892  0.099  0.792  0.991  0.198  0.520  0.364 




0.307  0.109  0.198  0.416  0.218  0.087  0.195 





0  0.563  -0.563  0.563  0  0  0.065 
 
* Shares refer to the total for a given ownership type. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on firm-level data provided by Gostkomstat. 
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Table 9 - Job flows by size and ownership – 1997, continuing small firms  
 










0.155  0.197  -0.043  0.352  0.309  0.019  0.020 





0.139  0.275  -0.136  0.414  0.278  0.056  0.089 





0.111  0.337  -0.226  0.448  0.222  0.101  0.247 





0.195  0.161  0.033  0.356  0.323  0.561  0.376 





0.128  0.121  0.007  0.248  0.241  0.263  0.201 





0.000  0.563  -0.563  0.563  0.000  0.000  0.067 
 
* Shares refer to the total for a given ownership type. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on firm-level data provided by Gostkomstat.   29
 
Table 10 - Separate job flows by ownership type and by size – 1997, small firms 
 
  Moscow        Chelyabinsk        Chuvashya       
















All  0.802  0.147  0.867  0.566  0.159  0.231  0.065  0.334  0.355  0.147  0.068  0.100 
Private  0.771  0.152  0.772  0.828  0.143  0.244  0.791  0.929  0.306  0.155  0.754  0.922 
Mixed 
domestic 
0.928  0.128  0.228  0.172  0.280  0.137  0.209  0.071  0.707  0.093  0.246  0.078 
0-4  1.113  0.150  0.059  0.043  0.373  0.254  0.114  0.053  0.783  0.117  0.166  0.060 
5-9  1.179  0.163  0.154  0.116  0.234  0.354  0.172  0.178  0.375  0.197  0.111  0.141 
10-19  0.962  0.162  0.225  0.206  0.131  0.229  0.155  0.187  0.405  0.214  0.205  0.261 
20-49  0.870  0.141  0.466  0.413  0.151  0.267  0.384  0.468  0.374  0.135  0.448  0.391 
50-99  0.331  0.131  0.096  0.206  0.116  0.109  0.176  0.113  0.100  0.109  0.056  0.147 
>100  0.000  0.563  0.000  0.015          0.308  0.000  0.014  0.000 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on firm-level data provided by Gostkomstat.   30
 
 
Table 11 - Separate job flows by ownership type and by size – 1997, continuing small firms 
 
  Moscow        Chelyabinsk        Chuvashya       
















All  0.136  0.214  0.590  0.557  0.095  0.228  0.235  0.337  0.162  0.164  0.175  0.106 
Private  0.135  0.214  0.821  0.822  0.091  0.238  0.842  0.926  0.144  0.169  0.793  0.923 
Mixed 
domestic 
0.137  0.215  0.179  0.178  0.132  0.149  0.158  0.074  0.317  0.120  0.207  0.077 
1-4  0.187  0.238  0.043  0.035  0.052  0.258  0.022  0.046  0.145  0.169  0.049  0.056 
5-9  0.168  0.323  0.089  0.108  0.090  0.373  0.105  0.182  0.097  0.230  0.060  0.142 
10-19  0.156  0.287  0.191  0.222  0.095  0.226  0.191  0.190  0.150  0.248  0.161  0.262 
20-49  0.139  0.211  0.413  0.397  0.089  0.261  0.377  0.462  0.210  0.149  0.559  0.393 
50-99  0.111  0.148  0.264  0.222  0.116  0.109  0.305  0.120  0.100  0.109  0.136  0.147 
>100  0.000  0.563  0.000  0.016          0.308  0.000  0.035  0.000 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on firm-level data provided by Gostkomstat.   31
 




   
 
Instrumental Variables 









ln(size)  -0.0166  0.0107 
  -0.0033  0.0076 
 
State     
     
 
Private  -0.4713  0.0774 
***  -0.3064  0.0462 
*** 
Mixed  -0.1522  0.0883 
*  -0.0192  0.0587 
 
Large and State     
     
 
Private*small  1.4685  0.0781 
***  3.2176  0.2430 
*** 
Mixed*small  1.2619  0.1271 
***  3.1147  0.5836 
*** 
Ln(size)*private  0.0998  0.0161 
***  0.0710  0.0102 
*** 
Ln(size)*mixed  0.0447  0.0164 
***  0.0185  0.0108 
* 
Ln(size)*small*private  -0.2554  0.0195 
***  -0.8921  0.0898 
*** 
Ln(size)*small*mixed  -0.1419  0.0398 
***  -0.8252  0.2116 
*** 
Energy and Mining     
     
 
Trade and Distribution  0.1184  0.1751 
  0.1260  0.1809 
 
Construction  -0.1665  0.1763 
  -0.1782  0.1821 
 
Metallurgic  -0.3523  0.2025 
*  -0.3421  0.2094 
 
Chemical  -0.2875  0.2175 
  -0.2839  0.2210 
 
Engineering  -0.0550  0.1785 
  -0.0569  0.1843 
 
Wood Industry  -0.0069  0.1915 
  -0.0188  0.1977 
 
Light Industry  0.0122  0.1867 
  -0.0205  0.1922 
 
Building Industry  0.1488  0.1983 
  0.1326  0.2043 
 
Food Industry  0.1302  0.1939 
  0.1209  0.1989 
 
Other Industries  0.0094  0.1892 
  0.0077  0.1946 
 
Krasnoyarsk     
     
 
Moscow  0.2548  0.0245 
***  0.2528  0.0247 
*** 
Chuvashya  -0.2048  0.0411 
***  -0.1862  0.0419 
*** 
Chelyabinsk  -0.5033  0.0340 
***  -0.5020  0.0345 
*** 
Constant  -0.0750  0.1787 
  -0.1291  0.1797 
 
Observations = 9636     
       
Prob. F>0 = 0.000     
       
 
* Statistically significant at the 10% level ** Statistically significant at the 5% level *** Statistically significant at the 1% level  
Source: Firm-level data provided by Gostkomstat.   32

















ln(size)  0.0025  0.0056 
  0.0037  0.0046 
 
State     
     
 
Private  -0.1671  0.0400 
***  -0.0983  0.0264 
*** 
Mixed  -0.0828  0.0517 
  -0.0513  0.0349 
 
Large and State     
     
 
Private*small  0.1592  0.0467 
***  -0.4335  0.1410 
*** 
Mixed*small  0.1151  0.0864 
  -0.3419  0.3736 
** 
Ln(size)*private  0.0302  0.0081 
***  0.0169  0.0057 
*** 
Ln(size)*mixed  0.0090  0.0093 
  0.0037  0.0062 
 
Ln(size)*small*private  -0.0230  0.0113 
**  0.1836  0.0509 
*** 
Ln(size)*small*mixed  -0.0032  0.0263 
  0.1572  0.1333 
 
Energy and Mining     
     
 
Trade and Distribution  -0.0199  0.0963 
  -0.0156  0.0963 
 
Construction  -0.1506  0.0971 
  -0.1621  0.0970 
* 
Metallurgic  0.0122  0.1185 
  0.0139  0.1188 
 
Chemical  -0.1360  0.1115 
  -0.1327  0.1116 
 
Engineering  -0.0216  0.0984 
  -0.0264  0.0985 
 
Wood Industry  0.0143  0.1057 
  0.0100  0.1058 
 
Light Industry  -0.0784  0.1042 
  -0.0863  0.1042 
 
Building Industry  -0.0029  0.1091 
  -0.0097  0.1091 
 
Food Industry  0.0295  0.0991 
  0.0136  0.0989 
* 
Other Industries  -0.0666  0.1037 
  -0.0734  0.1036 
 
Krasnoyarsk     
     
 
Moscow  0.0391  0.0152 
**  0.0383  0.0152 
** 
Chuvashya  0.0801  0.0258 
***  0.0830  0.0258 
*** 
Chelyabinsk  -0.0319  0.0212 
  -0.0278  0.0213 
 
Constant  -0.0847  0.0980 
  -0.0862  0.0958 
 
Observations = 8088     
       
Prob. F>0 = 0.000     
       
 
* Statistically significant at the 10% level ** Statistically significant at the 5% level *** Statistically significant at the 1% level  
Source: Firm-level data provided by Gostkomstat.   33
Table 14 - Predicted net employment growth rates 
 
All           OLS  Instrumental variable 
Large and Medium State Firm, Krasnoyarsk      -0.0750  -0.1291   
Large and Medium State Firm, Moscow      0.1799  0.1237   
Private Firm, Krasnoyarsk, 500 workers      0.0738  0.0061   
Private Firm, Krasnoyarsk, 2000 workers      0.2121  0.1046   
Private Firm, Moscow, 500 workers       0.3286  0.2588   
Private Firm, Moscow, 2000 workers       0.4669  0.3573   
Small Mixed Ownership Firm, Moscow, 50 workers    0.9092  0.0634   
Small Mixed Ownership Firm, Moscow, 10 workers    1.0657  1.3617   
Small Mixed Ownership Firm, Chelyabinsk, 10 workers    0.3076  0.6069   
Small Private Firm, Chelyabinsk, 50 workers      -0.1899  -0.9318   
Small Private Firm, Chelyabinsk, 10 workers      0.0606  0.3896   
Small Private Firm, Moscow, 100 workers      0.4603  -0.7461   
Small Private Firm, Moscow, 50 workers      0.5682  -0.1770   
Small Private Firm, Moscow, 10 workers      0.8187  1.1444   
                
Continuing           OLS  Instrumental variable 
Large State or Mixed Firm, Krasnoyarsk or Chelyabinsk    -0.0847  -0.0862   
Small Private Firm, Chuvashya, 100 workers      0.0207  0.3885   
Small Private Firm, Chuvashya, 50 workers      0.0157  0.2495   
Small Private Firm, Chuvashya, 10 workers      0.0042  -0.0733   
Small Private Firm, Moscow, 100 workers      -0.0203  0.3438   
Small Private Firm, Moscow, 50 workers      -0.0253  0.2048   
Small Private Firm, Moscow, 10 workers      -0.0369  -0.1180   
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on regressions of Tables 12 and 13.   34
Table 15 - Regression results. Dependent variable: Employment growth rate of firm i in 1997 – All medium and large 
Firms  
 
  OLS      Instrumental Variables     









ln(size)  -0.0133  0.0090 
  -0.0022  0.0050 
 
State     
     
 
Private  -0.1016  0.0634 
  -0.0679  0.0338 
** 
Mixed  -0.0865  0.0773 
  -0.0233  0.0465 
 
Ln(size)*private  0.0189  0.0129 
  0.0112  0.0067 
* 
Ln(size)*mixed  0.0166  0.0139 
  0.0026  0.0078 
 
Energy and Mining     
     
 
Trade and Distribution  -0.0786  0.0453 
*  -0.0719  0.0441 
 
Construction  -0.1612  0.0460 
***  -0.1619  0.0452 
*** 
Metallurgic  -0.0906  0.0694 
  -0.0900  0.0694 
 
Chemical  -0.1090  0.0626 
*  -0.1130  0.0620 
* 
Engineering  -0.1081  0.0455 
**  -0.1120  0.0449 
** 
Wood Industry  -0.1363  0.0516 
***  -0.1400  0.0508 
*** 
Light Industry  -0.2070  0.0472 
***  -0.2069  0.0463 
*** 
Building Industry  -0.1472  0.0499 
***  -0.1495  0.0493 
*** 
Food Industry  -0.0688  0.0457 
  -0.0716  0.0447 
 
other Industry  -0.1271  0.0481 
***  -0.1276  0.0471 
*** 
Krasnoyarsk     
     
 
Moscow  -0.0124  0.0175 
  -0.0126  0.0176 
 
Chuvashya  0.0811  0.0247 
***  0.0840  0.0245 
*** 
Chelyabinsk  0.0048  0.0212 
  0.0053  0.0213 
 
Constant  0.0915  0.0640 
  0.0442  0.0507 
 
Observations = 5810       
     
Prob. F>0 = 0.000       
     
 
* Statistically significant at the 10% level ** Statistically significant at the 5% level *** Statistically significant at the 1% level  
Source: Firm-level data provided by Gostkomstat.   35
Table 16 - Weighted regression results. Dependent variable: Employment growth rate of firm i in 1997 – All medium 
and large continuing firms 
 
  OLS      Instrumental Variables    









ln(size)  0.0062  0.0049 
  0.0054  0.0038 
 
State     
     
 
Private  -0.1681  0.0362 
***  -0.0929  0.0233 
*** 
Mixed  -0.1156  0.0485 
**  -0.0793  0.0319 
** 
Ln(size)*private  0.0276  0.0075 
***  0.0135  0.0050 
*** 
Ln(size)*mixed  0.0151  0.0086 
*  0.0085  0.0055 
 
Energy and Mining     
     
 
Trade and Distribution  -0.0622  0.0225 
***  -0.0677  0.0214 
*** 
Construction  -0.1308  0.0232 
***  -0.1316  0.0225 
*** 
Metallurgic  -0.1476  0.0350 
***  -0.1427  0.0350 
*** 
Chemical  -0.1171  0.0373 
***  -0.1150  0.0372 
*** 
Engineering  -0.1324  0.0219 
***  -0.1321  0.0213 
*** 
Wood Industry  -0.1176  0.0276 
***  -0.1172  0.0270 
*** 
Light Industry  -0.1640  0.0270 
***  -0.1638  0.0262 
*** 
Building Industry  -0.1265  0.0292 
***  -0.1249  0.0287 
*** 
Food Industry  -0.0209  0.0252 
  -0.0205  0.0243 
 
other Industry  -0.0975  0.0260 
***  -0.0996  0.0253 
*** 
Krasnoyarsk     
     
 
Moscow  -0.0014  0.0113 
  -0.0024  0.0113 
 
Chuvashya  0.0406  0.0146 
***  0.0405  0.0146 
*** 
Chelyabinsk  0.0154  0.0147 
  0.0150  0.0147 
 
Constant  -0.0313  0.0326 
  -0.0229  0.0271 
 
Observations = 5670       
     
Prob. F>0 = 0.000       
     
 
* Statistically significant at the 10% level ** Statistically significant at the 5% level *** Statistically significant at the 1% level  
Source: Firm-level data provided by Gostkomstat. 
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Figure 1- Net employment growth rates by firms size – All regions 
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Figure 2 – Net employment growth rates by firms size - Moscow 
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Figure 3 - Net employment growth rates by firms size – Krasnoyarsk 
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Figure 4 - Net employment growth rates by firms size - Chelyabinsk  
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Figure 5 - Net employment growth rates by firms size – Chuvashia 
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Notes 
1 These regions are Moscow City, Krasnoyarsk, Chuvashia and Chelyabinsk.  The reasons 
for choosing them as representative economic regions within the Russian Federation are 
discussed in Lehmann, Wadsworth and Acquisti (1998).  
2 Exit and entry take on the polar values –2 and 2, while contraction and expansion will be 
represented by intermediate negative and positive values respectively.  
3 Assume that all firms have contracted by p% and that no firm expanded employment.  
Then gross would give a job reallocation rate of p% even though no job reallocation 
occurred.   
4 Unfortunately, due to logistic problems data for small firms in Krasnoyarsk were not made 
available. 
5 Gimpelson and Lippoldt (1998), using the same data set, give such overall rates for regions 
and ownership types.  This, however, requires too strong assumptions about how 
representative these three industries are in the job creation and job destruction process of the 
entire economy of the chosen regions.  
6 These are pos, neg, job creation and destruction shares. 
7 Compare e.g. the excess rate for firms in categories 1-49 and 50-99 in Table 4. 
8 Cf. For example Evans (1987a,b) and Dunne et al. (1989). 
9 Ownership categories do not vary over time, so we only need one subscript across firms.  
10 We exclude firms whose net growth rate takes on the value of 2 or -2. 
11 Experiments with other regressions where we all firms from Krasnoyark had been 
eliminated provided very similar results. 
 